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EXECUTIVE ACTION IN THE FACE OF
CONGRESSIONAL INACTION: EDUCATION WAIVERS
CIRCUMVENTING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 27, 2010, President Barak Obama addressed
members of Congress and the nation in his State of the Union
speech regarding education reform.
[W]e need to invest in the skills and education of our people.
Now, this year, we’ve broken through the stalemate between
left and right by launching a national competition to improve
our schools. And the idea here is simple: Instead of rewarding
failure, we only reward success. Instead of funding the status
quo, we only invest in reform—reform that raises student
achievement; inspires students to excel in math and science;
and turns around failing schools that steal the future of too
many young Americans . . . And in this country, the success of
our children cannot depend more on where they live than on
their potential. When we renew the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, we will work with Congress to
expand these reforms to all 50 states.1

Despite his optimistic intentions at the start of his
presidency, President Obama has, so far, failed to fulfill his
pledge to reform the No Child Left Behind Act, a bill passed
under the Bush administration that was heavily criticized from
both the political left and right. Although the Act was up for
reauthorization in 2007, Congress has yet to pass any federal
legislation under President Obama’s leadership, as partisan
lines and lack of compromise have left Congress at a
standstill.2 In response, the Obama administration’s Secretary
1
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 111th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2010state-union-address#transcript.
2
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6302 (2006); see also Cynthia G. Brown & Jeremy Ayers, Education Waivers 101: Eight Questions You Should
Ask About Education Waivers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/news/2011/09/23/10295-/educationwaivers-101/ (stating that NCLB has been operating on “auto-pilot” since 2007).
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of Education, Arne Duncan, has issued conditional waivers to
school districts, exempting them from NCLB requirements only
if a school district agrees to implement the Obama
administration’s
educational
policy.3
Instead
of
a
comprehensive law that respects the legislative process and our
constitutional foundation, the overreach of the executive
branch is shaping our education reform.
Part II of this paper will critique the divided political
climate and education policy stalemate in Congress that
currently exists, preventing the passage of federal education
policy legislation. Part III will discuss the constitutional
framework and statutory provisions that govern executive
action in education. Part IV will evaluate President Obama’s
current actions in issuing waivers to various school districts,
circumventing the legislative process, and Congress’
subsequent reaction to such executive action. Part V will then
balance constitutional concerns with practical interests.
II.

EDUCATION POLICY STALEMATE IN CONGRESS

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”), a
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, was enacted by the 107th Congress and signed into law by
President George W. Bush on January 8, 2002, in an effort “to
close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and
choice, so that no child is left behind.”4 As a priority on
President Bush’s legislative agenda, NCLB was intended to
increase student achievement and hold states more
accountable for student progress, focusing primarily on
minority students.5 Specifically, NCLB required states to
administer annual tests for grades three through eight in
reading and mathematics in which students were to score

3
Memorandum from Emily Barbour et al., Cong. Research Serv., to House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, Sec’y of Educ.’s Waiver Auth. with Respect to Title I-A Provisions Included in the Elementary and Secondary Educ. Act 4
(2011).
4
107 P.L. 110; 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941
(2006)) (reiterating that the purpose of the Act is “to ensure that all children have a
fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at
a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and
state academic assessments.”).
5
No Child Left Behind, EDUC. WEEK, http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/nochild-left-behind/ (last updated Sept. 19, 2011).
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“proficient” by the 2013–2014 school year.6 States were also
required to track the progress of the student population as a
whole, in addition to the progress of individual demographic
groups, ensuring “adequate yearly progress.”7 NCLB received
substantial bipartisan support in Congress, with both
Democrats and Republicans advocating for increased school
district accountability for the education of America’s poor and
minority children.8
Although NCLB received widespread support initially, it
became the subject of harsh criticism from both the political
left and right once it was implemented.9 Once championed as
legislation that would provide opportunity and advance the
education of poor and minority students, NCLB was now being
criticized for its “obsessive focus on test results.”10 Diane
Ravitch, Research Professor of Education at New York
6
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941; see also No Child Left Behind, supra note 5 (“If a
school receiving federal Title I funding failed to meet the target two years in a row, it
would be provided technical assistance and its students would be offered a choice of
other public schools to attend. Students in schools that failed to make adequate progress three years in a row also were offered supplemental educational services, including private tutoring. For continued failures, a school would be subject to outside corrective measures, including possible governance changes.”); No Child Left Behind Act,
N.Y. TIMES (last updated July 6, 2012), http://archive.is/uQsV# (“Schools that fail to
make the required annual progress, whether overall or for subgroups, face a mounting
scale of sanctions, from being required to provide tutoring to students in poorperforming schools to the threat of state takeovers or the shutting down of individual
schools.”).
7
No Child Left Behind, supra note 5; see also No Child Left Behind Act, supra
note 6.
8
See Jack Kenny, Education Waivers Highlight Obama’s Executive Agenda,
NEW
A M.
(July
7,
2012,
4:30
PM),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/education/item/11991-education-waivershighlight-obamas-executive-agenda (stating that “[t]he goal of holding schools and
school districts responsible for the education of poor and minority students generated
widespread, bipartisan support for the No Child Left Behind Act. . .”); see also Ben
Feller & Kimberly Hefling, Official: 10 States Given Waiver on No Child Left Behind
Learning
Laws,
NBCNEWS.COM
(Feb.
9,
2012,
7:02
AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/46323704/ns/politics/t/official-states-given-waiver-no-childleft-behind-learning-laws/#.URCsZ1qLwVk (reiterating that “No Child Left Behind
was primarily designed to help the nation’s poor and minority children and was passed
a decade ago with widespread bipartisan support.”).
9
Kenny, supra note 8 (also citing that conservatives opposed the program “as
an unconstitutional imposition of federal authority over local and state education policies, while liberals have complained of underfunding.”).
10
No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6; see also CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY,
STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: TRENDS IN TEST PROGRAMS, ALTERNATE PATHWAYS,
AND
PASS
RATES
1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cepdc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=326 (“Changes in exit exam policies over the
past eight years reflect states’ struggles to develop standards and testing systems that
are sufficiently demanding but also achievable and fair.”).
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University, explained that “[t]he problem with using tests to
make important decisions about people’s lives is that
standardized tests are not precise instruments.”11 Testing
experts contend that test scores should be one part of a broader
assessment of student achievement, including final grades,
class participation, homework scores, and teacher assessments;
yet NCLB does not allow this comprehensive evaluation.12
Critics argue that because standardized testing and adequate
yearly progress are required for a school district to avoid
sanctions, the law’s rating system does not set practical goals
for schools to meet.13 During the 2010–2011 school year, almost
half of all public schools in the country failed to meet the
educational goals based on the NCLB rating system.14 Further,
opponents contend that NCLB has not improved the education
of students. The National Assessment of Educational Progress
math test results for 2009 show faster growth in student
achievement in the years before NCLB when states were in full
control of their education systems.15
11
DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL
SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 152 (2010); see also
Rosemary C. Salomone, The Common School Before and After Brown: Democracy,
Equality, and the Productivity Agenda, 120 YALE L. J. 1454, 1480 (2011).
12
RAVITCH, supra note 11; see also Meteor Blades, Jim Cummins Demolishes
NCLB’s Ideology and Practice, DAILY KOS (July 26, 2007, 11:49 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/7/26/131722/394 (quoting Jim Cummins in a
speech before the California Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages Association on July 25, 2007, stating that NCLB “standardized tests dominate curriculum
and instruction; first language literacy is discouraged and undervalued.”).
13
No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6; see also Kenny, supra note 8; Sam
Dillon, Obama To Seek Sweeping Change in “No Child” Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010,
at A1 (“The education law has been praised for focusing attention on achievement gaps,
but it has also generated tremendous opposition, especially from educators, who contend that it sets impossible goals for students and schools and humiliates students and
educators
when
they
fall
short.”),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/education/01child.html?pagewanted=all; but see
WORKING GRP. ON ELL POLICY, IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ENGLISH
LANGUAGE LEARNERS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6–7 (Mar. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.cal.org/topics/ell/ELL-Working-Group-ESEA.pdf (“NCLB has fostered
greater inclusion of ELLs [English Language Learners] in standards-based instruction,
assessment, and accountability than did prior authorizations of ESEA. By holding
schools and districts accountable for the performance of ELLs in acquiring proficiency
in English and in meeting grade-level performance standards for content area
achievement, the law has brought attention to both the language and academic content
needs of ELLs. With this attention have come positive actions and improved outcomes
for this traditionally underserved group.”).
14
Kenny, supra note 8 (noting that in Virginia, 61% of schools were failing to
meet their educational goals, and a startling 80 percent were failing in Massachusetts).
15
Sam Dillon, Sluggish Results Seen in Math Scores, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009,
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Yet even more troubling than schools failing to meet
educational goals are the numerous cheating scandals that
have been exposed since the passage of NCLB.16 In 2011, USA
Today identified 1,610 examples of “anomalies in which public
school classes—a school’s entire fifth grade, for example—
boasted what analysts regard as statistically rare, perhaps
suspect, gains on state tests.”17 The most infamous of these
cheating scandals occurred in the Atlanta public school district.
On March 29, 2013, the Fulton County Grand Jury issued
indictments of Atlanta Public School Superintendent Beverly
Hall and 34 other educational professionals for conspiring to
“‘either cheat, conceal cheating or retaliate against
whistleblowers’ in order to boost the school district’s scores on
Georgia’s Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT).”18
Opponents of NCLB, including Verdaillia Turner, president of
the Georgia Federation of Teachers, blame the law for these
cheating scandals, claiming that when there is “high-stakes
testing, which are one-shot deals” as with NCLB, it is “unfair to
children, [and] unfair to educators.”19 With similar cheating
schemes identified in Texas20 and California,21 critics of NCLB
at A18 (“Scores increased only marginally for eighth graders and not at all for fourth
graders, continuing a sluggish six-year trend of slowing achievement growth since passage
of
the
law.”)
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/education/15math.html; see also JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART:
ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA 10–11 (2010) (noting that by allowing states to decide the difficulty of their
tests, NCLB creates a perverse incentive for states to “dumb down” their academic and
proficiency standards, converting a “race to the top” to a “race to the bottom.”).
16
Motoko Rich, ‘No Child’ Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com-/2012/07/06/education/no-childleft-behind-whittled-down-under-obama.html (faulting NCLB’s focus on test results as
leading to “some notorious cheating scandals.”).
17
Greg Toppo, et al., When Test Scores Seem Too Good to Believe, USA TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.-com/news/education/2011-03-06-school-testing_N.htm (last
updated Mar. 17, 2011, 12:44 PM) (The USA Today investigation included three to seven years of test scores from Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and
Washington, D.C.).
18
Ned Resnikoff, Atlanta Cheating Scandal Puts National Education Policy on
Trial, NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 1, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/04/01/atlantacheating-scandal-puts-national-education-policy-on-trial (NCLB critics “argue that the
Atlanta cheating scandal is not an isolated incident of criminal activity.”).
19
Id. (quoting Interview by MSNBC with Verdaillia Turner, President, Georgia
Federation of Teachers, (Apr. 1, 2013)) (noting that there was increased pressure in
Georgia to obtain NCLB federal funds since the state cut education spending per student by 14.8% since 2008).
20
Claudio Sanchez, El Paso Schools Cheating Scandal: Who’s Accountable?,
NPR (Apr. 10, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/04/10/176784631/el-pasoschools-cheating-scandal-probes-officials-accountability (noting that Lorenzo Garcia
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have increasing evidence that the law fails to serve its purpose
of improving the education of poor and minority students.
Despite the overwhelming criticism of NCLB, little action
has been taken by Congress to rectify its weaknesses. In 2007,
the act was up for reauthorization, with President Bush
supporting the continuation of the law, stating that one of his
“top priorities . . . will be the reauthorization and the
strengthening of the No Child Left Behind Act.”22 The Bush
administration intended to improve the law by proposing
funding for a new program to bring math and science
professionals into the classroom, providing parents of children
in struggling schools with information of transfer options, and
setting higher standards of high school achievement. Further, a
$1.5 billion initiative to fund more testing and a program to
train over 70,000 new teachers in Advance Placement courses
was established.23 However, President Bush was unable to
persuade Congress to undertake the reauthorization of NCLB
during the last year of his presidency, as disagreements over
the role of the federal government in education and harsh
criticisms of the Act resulted in a partisan standstill.24
In March 2010, President Obama released his proposal to
reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
entitled “A Blueprint for Reform.”25 His blueprint was “not only
was the first superintendent convicted of “fraud and reporting bogus test scores for financial gain” after changing test scores and forcing academically struggling students to
drop out of Bowie High School while collecting more than $56,000 in bonuses).
21
Howard Blume, State Strips 23 Schools of API Rankings for Cheating, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/28/local/la-me-tests-cheating20121029 (citing 23 schools that were stripped of a key state ranking by state officials
for “cheating, other misconduct or mistakes in administering the standardized tests
given last spring.”).
22
See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Bush
Discusses No Child Left Behind (Oct. 5, 2006) available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061005-6.html (President Bush addressing Woodridge Elementary and Middle Campus in Washington, D.C.).
23
See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The No
Child Left Behind Act: Challenging Students Through High Expectations (Oct. 5,
2006),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/200610052.html (specifying other Bush proposals to improve NCLB, including a scholarship program to allow 28,000 low income children to transfer to a private or religious school of
their choice).
24
See Associated Press, Education Department Allows States to Get Waivers on
No
Child
Tests,
FOX
NEWS
(Aug.
9,
2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/09/education-department-allows-states-to-getwaivers-on-no-child-tests/?test=latestnews; see also Feller & Hefling, supra note 8.
25
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF
THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT
(2010), available at
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a plan to renovate a flawed law, but also an outline for a reenvisioned federal role in education,”26 focusing on
(1) Improving teacher quality and principal effectiveness to
ensure that every classroom has a great teacher and every
school has a great leader; (2) Providing information to families to help them evaluate and improve their children’s
schools, and to educators to help them improve their students’
learning; (3) Implementing college- and career-ready standards and developing improved assessments aligned with those
standards; and (4) Improving student learning and achievement in America’s lowest-performing schools by providing intensive support and effective interventions.27

President Obama’s Blueprint for Reform attempted to
correct NCLB’s overemphasis on testing by eliminating the
school rating system based on students’ test scores and “annual
yearly progress,” and extending the 2014 proficiency deadline
to 2020.28 While the Blueprint restates a commitment to meet
the needs of poor and minority students, including English
language learners and students with disabilities, it proposes no
details or strategies for school districts to implement.29
President Obama’s Blueprint for Reform changed some
evident weaknesses in President Bush’s No Child Left Behind
Act; however, the proposed blueprint still faced opposition in
Congress and has yet to become law.30 Some education scholars
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf; see also Education Department Allows States to Get Waivers on No Child Tests, supra note 24 (emphasizing that
President Obama waited a year into his presidency before proposing his changes to the
education policy).
26
Id. at 2.
27
Id.; see also No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6 (identifying A Blueprint
for Reform as “a sweeping overhaul of the law in March 2010 that would encourage
states to raise academic standards, end the identification of tens of thousands of reasonably managed schools as failing and refocus energies on turning around the few
thousand schools that are in the worst shape.”).
28
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 25, at 9–10; see also Salomone, supra
note 11, at 1479.
29
Salomone, supra note 11, at 1479 (noting that the Blueprint reiterates the
Obama administration’s 2009 “Race to the Top” initiative which “placed states in competition . . . for $4.35 billion in education stimulus funds allocated for fiscal year 2010”
by inducing school districts “to create data-driven systems for training and evaluating
teachers and principals, encourage the establishment of high-quality charter schools,
develop plans for turning around failing schools, demonstrate statewide political consensus for proposed reforms, and adopt the national education standards” in order to
qualify).
30
No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6 (noting that “teachers’ unions and
some Republican lawmakers immediately signaled their dislike for pieces of the plan,
complicating the administration’s job as Congress takes up the task of reworking the
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argued that the Blueprint failed to provide any specifics on how
to implement the changes, stating “[i]t might be easy to
overstate the significance of the Blueprint; it is an extremely
vague forty-one page document that neither resembles a
statute nor resolves many of the particularities that an
eventual statute in this realm will.”31 Without specific
instructions on how to implement the changes to the law, or
detailed changes to NCLB in general, the Blueprint has proven
to be nothing more than a theoretical idea, with no chance of
actual execution.
Moreover, partisanship in Congress has prevented the
passage of a sweeping federal policy in education reform. Those
on the left attribute the lack of education policy legislation to
the “highly partisan bills” proposed by Republicans “that would
scale back federal accountability for low-performing schools
and students, and even limit accountability for how states and
districts use taxpayer funds.”32 The Republican-majority House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, led by
Representative John Kline (R) from Minnesota, has proposed
three bills focusing on more specific areas of education;33 yet
these bills have never made it to the House floor for debate or
vote.34 Another bill, proposed by Senator Tom Harkin (D) of
Iowa, Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee, supported “state-designed accountability
systems” and “flexibility for innovation on the local level,”
restoring power to the states to set “college and career ready
academic standards.”35 Yet Secretary of Education Arne
No Child law” and that “even if lawmakers were to adopt the plan in its broad outlines,
experts said, years of work would be required to roll out the new federal policies to
states and in the nation’s 15,000 school districts.”).
31
Sandy Kress, Stephanie Zechmann, & J. Matthew Schmitten, Symposium,
Education Reform: When Performance Matters: The Past, Present, and Future of Consequential Accountability in Public Education, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 185, 228 (2011).
32
Brown & Ayers, supra note 2 (defending President Obama’s issuance of waivers to school districts, stating “[w]ith little prospect for bipartisan cooperation in sight,
the Obama administration is wise to take action to ensure states, districts, and schools
move forward in education reform.”).
33
Sally Holland, White House Announces Waivers for No Child Left Behind
Law,
CNN.COM,
Aug.
9,
2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/08/08/no.child.waivers-/index.html
(specifying
that these bills were “intended to streamline education programs, address charter
school issues and give states and localities more flexibility in spending their federal
dollars” and that only the charter school bill had bipartisan support).
34
Id.
35
U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, HELP
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Duncan argued that the Harkin-Enzi bill “compromises too
much, particularly on teacher evaluations and studentachievement goals.”36 Further, minority student advocates
criticize the bill’s elimination of central, federal accountability,
claiming that the bill “would represent ‘a significant step
backward,’ returning the nation to the years before [NCLB’s]
passage, when many states did a slipshod job of promoting
student achievement.”37
More recently, on June 6, 2013, Representative John Kline
(R) introduced another reauthorization of ESEA to the House
floor, H.R. 5: Student Success Act.38 On July 19, 2013, the
House of Representatives voted to pass the Student Success
Act with a vote of 221–207.39 According to Rep. Kline, the
Student Success Act “eliminates the one-size-fits-all
Adequately Yearly Progress (AYP) metric and returns
authority for measuring student achievement to states and
school districts” while encouraging states and districts “to
develop teacher evaluations systems that better gauge an
educator’s influence on student learning.”40 Further, the
Student Success Act grants “maximum flexibility to develop
effective school improvement strategies for underperforming
schools.”41 While the passage of this bill in the House suggests
advancement towards a comprehensive federal education
policy, it is highly unlikely that the Student Success Act will
pass in the Senate. For one, the bill is co-sponsored by twelve
Committee Approves Bipartisan Bill to Fix No Child Left Behind (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press-/release/?id=9b968366-140f-4b60a568-2f6efa48877c&groups=Chair (noting that the “bipartisan Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization Act passed out of committee by a bipartisan vote of
15 to 7”); see also Dillon, supra note 13.
36
Sam Dillon, Senate Panel Approves Bill That Rewrites Education Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A9; see also Holland, supra note 33 (quoting Secretary Duncan:
“The law—No Child Left Behind—as it currently stands is four years overdue for being
rewritten. It is far too punitive, it is far too prescriptive, lead to a dummying down of
standards, lead to a narrowing of the curriculum . . . We can’t afford to have the law of
the land be one that has so many perverse incentives or disincentives to the kind of
progress that we want to see.”).
37
Sam Dillon, Bill Would Overhaul No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2011, at A9.
38
H.R.
5:
Student
Success
Act,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5 (last updated July 24, 2013).
39
Final
Vote
Results
for
Roll
Call
374,
HOUSE.GOV,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll374.xml (last visited March 13, 2014).
40 Education,
U.S.
CONGRESSMAN
JOHN
KLINE,
http://kline.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=109065 (last visited March 13, 2014).
41
Id.
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Republicans and passed in the House by a narrow margin
without a single Democratic vote.42 To pass in the Democratcontrolled Senate, the bill would need to have bipartisan
support; however, that this would occur is doubtful. Critics
from the political left claim the bill “does nothing to ensure
that state standards are rigorous enough to make sure
students graduate from school college and career ready”43 and
“neglects to close a well-known federal loophole that allows
districts to allocate fewer dollars to high-poverty schools
compared to more affluent schools.”44 The National Education
Association claims the Student Success Act “erodes the
historical federal role in public education: targeting resources
to marginalized student populations as a means of helping to
ensure equity of opportunity for all students.”45 While one can
hope that bipartisan compromise could save this bill in the
Senate, failed legislative attempts in the past of reauthorizing
the ESEA suggest that the Student Success Act will not become
federal law, leaving NCLB to continue to run on “auto-pilot” as
it has been since 2007.46
This political climate, and the stalemate in Congress, has
brought about President Obama’s practice of issuing
conditional waivers of NCLB provisions to school districts. As
Secretary Duncan said when he released waivers to districts in
Washington
and
Wisconsin,
“A
strong,
bipartisan
reauthorization of the ESEA remains the best path forward in
education reform, but as 26 states have now demonstrated, our
42
Final
Vote
Results
for
Roll
Call
374,
HOUSE.GOV,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll374.xml (last visited March 13, 2014); see also
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/113-2013/h374.
43
Melissa Lazarín, The Student Success Act Is the Wrong Way Forward,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(July
18,
2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/news/2013/07/18/70033/the-studentsuccess-act-is-the-wrong-way-forward/ (arguing that “in pursuit of flexibility and increased local control, the House Republican bill limits federal oversight in ways that
can actually undermine educational opportunities for students.”).
44
Id. (“Federal Title I dollars are intended to narrow the funding gap between
high- and low-poverty schools . . . but the ability of federal Title I dollars to equalize
school funding is undermined by a common practice that allows districts to use average
teacher-salary figures and teacher-student rations in their school budget allocations,
masking inequities.”).
45
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)-ESEA, NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nea.org/home/-NoChildLeftBehindAct.html (last visited
March 14, 2014).
46
Brown & Ayers, supra note 2; see also Education Department Allows States to
Get Waivers on No Child Tests, supra note 24 (noting that “Duncan has warned that 82
percent of U.S. schools could be labeled failures next year if the law is not changed.”).
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kids can’t wait any longer for Congress to act.”47 With a lack of
cohesion and partisan lines preventing a comprehensive federal
education policy from being passed in Congress, one could
argue that waivers are the only option available to the Obama
administration to implement change. However, where
conditional waivers bypass the legislative process fundamental
to our Constitution, one must also be cautious of the legal basis
for such executive action.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
When discussing the constitutionality of President Obama’s
actions with regard to unilaterally issuing waivers to school
districts, it is critical to examine the executive and
congressional functions outlined in the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has ruled that, “the President’s power, if any,
to issue an [executive] order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”48 Article II, Section I
of the Constitution states, “[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.”49 Article
II, Section III further establishes that the President shall “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”50 These provisions
are the primary justifications for unilateral action by the
executive. Conversely, Article I, Section I provides that, “All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives.”51 Article I, Section 8 further empowers
Congress “to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper.”52 These constitutional underpinnings are at the heart
of the current debate over education policy, as Congress argues
that President Obama’s actions of issuing waivers to school
districts infringes on its Article I power to legislate. As
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham iterates, the President is
“using executive orders as a political tool—‘I can’t work with
47
Kenny, supra note 8; see also Holland, supra note 33 (quoting Secretary Duncan: “We hope that this is simply a transition or bridge to fixing the law.”).
48
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
49
U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
50
U.S. CONST. art. II, § III.
51
U.S. CONST. art. I, § I.
52
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Congress so I’m going to do it myself.”53 Such action violates
the separation of powers doctrine.
Provisions under the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (ESEA), as reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, provide a statutory framework to examine executive
authority to issue waivers relieving school districts of NCLB
requirements. In the ESEA, Congress delegated certain powers
to the Secretary of Education, one of the fifteen heads of
executive departments through which the President has the
ability to act.54 Section 9401 of the ESEA establishes that “the
Secretary [of Education] may waive any statutory or regulatory
requirement of this Act . . . for a State educational agency, local
educational agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local
educational agency, that (1) receives funds under a program
authorized by this Act . . . and (2) requests a waiver under
subsection (b).”55 It is worthy to note that the text of the
statute, both plain and unambiguous, grants the Secretary
broad, discretionary power to waive any requirement of
NCLB.56 Section 9401(c) of the ESEA does provide for
restrictions on the Secretary’s waiver authority; these
restrictions, however, do not relate to testing requirements,
which are the most commonly requested waivers by school
districts.57
53
Laura Meckler, Obama Shifts View of Executive Power, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 20,
2012,
12:31
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303812904577292273665694712.html
(noting that Senator Graham “generally supports Mr. Obama’s executive actions in national security but not on domestic affairs.”).
54
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President appoints his
cabinet with the advice and consent of the Senate).
55
20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2011); see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2.
56
See BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2, 4 (noting that the Secretary’s discretionary authority was affirmed when a federal court rejected a state’s challenge to a
denial of its waiver request in State of Connecticut v. Spellings); see also State of Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 495 (D. Conn. 2006) (stating that “the language of the provision governing waivers grants the Secretary broad discretion to deny
states’ waiver requests”), aff’d on other grounds, Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1471 (2011); see, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
57
20 U.S.C. § 7861(c) (2011). “The Secretary shall not waive under this section
any statutory or regulatory requirements relating to (1) the allocation or distribution of
funds to States, local educational agencies, or other recipients of funds under this Act
[20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq.]; (2) maintenance of effort; (3) comparability of services; (4)
use of Federal funds to supplement, not supplant, non-Federal funds; (5) equitable participation of private school students and teachers; (6) parental participation and involvement; (7) applicable civil rights requirements; (8) the requirement for a charter
school under subpart 1 of part B of title V [20 USCS §§ 7221 et seq.]; (9) the prohibi-
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ESEA section 9401(b) establishes the specific process by
which a state educational agency, local educational agency, or
Indian tribe can request waivers. The waiver request
submitted to the Secretary of Education must meet, at a
minimum, the following requirements: the waiver must (1)
identify the Federal programs that will be affected by the
waiver, (2) include a description of how the Federal statutory
or regulatory requirements are to be waived and how waiving
the requirements will improve the quality of instruction and
academic achievement of students, (3) describe measurable
educational goals for each school year and methods to measure
annual progress, (4) explain how the waiver will help achieve
these annual goals, and (5) make clear how the schools will
continue to assist the same population of students served by
the Federal programs for which waivers have been requested.58
Waivers granted by the Secretary under Section 9401 may not
be extended for longer than four years; the Secretary, however,
“may extend the period . . . if the Secretary determines that (A)
the waiver has been effective in enabling the State or affected
recipient to carry out the activities for which the waiver was
requested and the waiver has contributed to improved student
achievement; and (B) the extension is in the public interest.”59
Conversely, if “the Secretary determines, after notice and an
opportunity for a hearing, that the performance of the State or
other recipient affected by the waiver has been inadequate to
justify a continuation of the waiver or if the waiver is no longer
necessary to achieve its original purposes,” the Secretary shall
terminate the waiver.60
Lastly, Section 9401(g) of the ESEA requires the Secretary
to publish “notice of the Secretary’s decision to grant each
waiver” in the Federal Register and to “provide for the
tions regarding (A) State aid in section 9522 [20 U.S.C. § 7902]; (B) use of funds for religious worship or instruction in section 9505 [20 U.S.C. § 7885]; and (C) activities in
section 9526 [20 U.S.C. § 7906]; or (10) the selection of a school attendance area or
school under subsections (a) and (b) of section 1113 [20 U.S.C. § 6313], except that the
Secretary may grant a waiver to allow a school attendance area or school to participate
in activities under part A of title I if the percentage of children from low-income families in the school attendance area or who attend the school is not more than 10 percentage points below the lowest percentage of those children for any school attendance
area or school of the local educational agency that meets the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of section 1113 [20 U.S.C. § 6313].”
58
20 U.S.C. § 7861(b)(1) (2011).
59
20 U.S.C. § 7861(d) (2011).
60
20 U.S.C. § 7861(f) (2011).
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dissemination of the notice to State educational agencies,
interested parties, including educators, parents, students,
advocacy and civil rights organizations, and the public.”61
Further, the Secretary of Education must submit annual
reports to Congress detailing the effectiveness of granted
waivers.62
The Secretary does not have the explicit authority, under
Section 9401, to impose new conditions on school districts; yet,
the Secretary may be able to enact new education policies by
implicitly or explicitly conditioning the waiver’s approval on
the school district acquiescing to new conditions.63 While
technically these conditions would not be required, as the
school district’s compliance would be voluntary and a separate
waiver request for an unconditional waiver could be
submitted,64 the Secretary would nonetheless be able to impose
the executive branch’s education policy without the
involvement or consent of Congress.65 Those opposed to
waivers, including Republicans in Congress and conservative
think tanks, argue that the Secretary’s act of placing conditions
on waivers is beyond the constitutional power of the
executive.66 As Senator Marco Rubio (R) from Florida expressed
in a letter to Secretary Duncan regarding the President’s
authority to issue waivers to school districts, “[o]ur principal
concern is that the Executive branch does not possess the
authority to force states into compliance with administrationbacked reforms instituted through the issuance of waivers. . . .
20 U.S.C. § 7861(g) (2011).
See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION’S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WAIVERS GRANTED UNDER SECTION 9401 OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2009 (Dec.
2010),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/freedom/local/flexibility/waiverletters/2010waiverreport.pdf; see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra
note 3, at 6–7.
63
BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 6–7.
64
Id. (arguing that “a reviewing court could deem the conditional waiver to be
arbitrary and capricious or in excess of the agency’s statutory authority.”).
65
Kenny, supra note 8 (highlighting that the “profusion of waivers has raised
the question of whether the Obama administration is using the procedure to bypass
Congress in the legislative promise . . .”).
66
Meckler, supra note 53 (quoting Senator Graham, saying that the President
is “using executive orders as a political tool—‘I can’t work with Congress so I’m going to
do it myself’”); see also Lindsey M. Burke, Issue Brief: No Child Left Behind Waivers:
Bogus Relief, Genuine Overreach, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws-.com/2012/pdf/ib3718.pdf (“[T]he waivers are part of a
long line of executive overreach that is not limited to education, compounding a pattern
of disregard for the normal legislative process.”).
61
62
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This initiative is an overstep of authority that undermines
existing law, and violates the constitutional separation of
powers.”67 Those in favor of the Secretary granting waivers,
including Democrats in Congress and liberal political
organizations, counter by arguing that Section 9401 does not
expressly forbid voluntary conditions on waivers and that this
has been common practice.68 Despite these concerns, a legal
challenge to the Secretary’s broad and extensive waiver
authority in federal court has yet to surface.69
IV. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CURRENT ACTIONS AND CONGRESS’
REACTION
With an education legislation standstill in Congress, the
Obama administration’s Secretary of Education Arne Duncan
has issued conditional waivers to school districts, releasing
them of certain NCLB requirements. With these waivers, the
Obama administration executed its own education policy
agenda, conditioning waiver approval on the school district
agreeing to certain provisions, thereby circumventing Congress’
involvement in policy making.70 As required by Section 9401 of
the ESEA, the Department of Education publishes an annual
count on all waivers granted.71 During the 2009 calendar year,

67
Letter from Sen. Marco Rubio to the Honorable Arne Duncan, Secretary of
Education
(Sept.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7c1cf499-4bfc-4db08a5b-5e3cc5291560.
68
Brown & Ayers, supra note 2; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, Harkin Statement on President’s Announcement of NCLB
Waivers
(Feb.
9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=d55d4e9b-f6ab-4db3-89abf09fe948d483 (quoting Senator Harkin: “House Republicans seem committed to pushing forward partisan legislation that will move our schools backwards . . . . In the face
of the House Republicans’ refusal to work across the aisle, President Obama has shown
great leadership in taking this step to relieve some states from some of the most burdensome requirements of NCLB while ensuring that those states commit to a modernized accountability system that maintains a focus on student success.”).
69
BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3 (stating that “[T]here are no federal court cases
that provide guidance regarding the scope of the Secretary’s waiver authority.”).
70
See No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6 (“In exchange for the education
waivers, schools and districts must promise to set new targets aimed at preparing students for colleges and careers. They must also tether evaluations of teachers and
schools in part to student achievement on standardized tests. The use of tests to judge
teacher effectiveness is a departure from No Child Left Behind, which used test scores
to rate schools and districts.”); see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3.
71
20 U.S.C. § 7861(g) (2011).
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Secretary Duncan issued 351 waivers.72 While few waivers
allowed state educational agencies to approve new schools or
provide supplemental educational services,73 the majority of the
waivers granted to school districts directly pertained to the
ESEA growth models or differentiated accountability
measures.74 During the 2010 calendar year, a total of 238
waivers were granted by the Department of Education under
its waiver authority granted by the ESEA, with many allowing
the state educational agency to redefine the “regulatory
definition of ‘persistently lowest-achieving schools.’”75
While recent statistics on the issuance of waivers have yet
to be reported in the Federal Register for the 2011, 2012 and
2013 calendar years, it is likely that the Obama administration
plans to continue on its path of unilateral executive action in
education. In September of 2011, President Obama clearly
expressed his intent to relieve failing school districts of strict
NCLB standards and put Congress on notice, stating “Congress
hasn’t been able to do it, so I will . . . Starting today, we’ll be
giving states more flexibility to meet high standards.”76 At the
72
U.S. Department of Education, “Notice of Waivers Granted Under Section
9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended,” 75 Federal
Register
56834-01
(Sept.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/other/2010-3/091610c.html; but see U.S.
Department of Education, “Notice of Waivers Granted Under Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended,” 74 Federal Register
22909–01 (May 15, 2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/other/2010-3/091610c.html (reporting that during the 2008 calendar year the Department of Education granted a total of 51 waivers under Section 9401, signifying nearly a
600% increase in waivers issued in 2009); BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 3–4 (“[O]ver
half of the waivers granted (196 waivers) were provided to LEAs and schools with respect to the treatment of their Title I-A funds granted under the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) when calculating the amount of Title I-A
funds that were required to be used to provide public school choice and supplemental
educational services (SES) and when calculating their per-pupil amount for SES, as
well as to waive a carryover limitation for Title I-A funds more than once every three
years.”).
73
BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 3–4.
74
Id. at 3–4; see also 34 CFR 200.20 (detailing specific requirements regarding
growth models).
75
U.S. Department of Education, “Notice of Waivers Granted Under Section
9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended; Notice,” 78
Federal
Register
71410
(November
27,
2013),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-27/html/2013-28504.htm.
76
President Barack Obama, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on No Child Left Behind Flexibility (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/23/remarks-president-no-child-leftbehind-flexibility (“[T]hese problems have been obvious to parents and educators all
over the country for years now. Despite the good intentions of some . . . Congress has
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start of the 2011–2012 school year, Secretary Arne Duncan
announced that he would “‘unilaterally’ grant waivers from the
100% proficiency requirement for states that have adopted
acceptable accountability programs and are ‘making other
strides toward’ school improvement” because Congress has
“failed thus far to act on reauthorization.”77
The Obama administration stayed true to its position on
waivers during the 2012 year. On February 9, 2012, the
administration issued waivers to ten states, relieving them of
the student proficiency requirement in reading and math by
2014 “in exchange for embracing the administration’s
educational agenda and its focus on accountability and teacher
effectiveness.”78 On May 29, 2012, eight more states were
granted waivers regarding the proficiency requirement,79 with
five more states joining the ranks on June 29, 2012, by
agreeing “to enact new standards and evaluate schools and
teachers based on students’ academic progress.”80 The
not been able to fix these flaws so far. I’ve urged Congress for a while now, let’s get a
bipartisan effort, let’s fix this. Congress hasn’t been able to do it. So I will. Our kids
only get one shot at a decent education. They cannot afford to wait any longer . . . So
starting today, we’ll be giving states more flexibility to meet high standards. Keep in
mind, the change we’re making is not lowering standards; we’re saying we’re going to
give you more flexibility to meet high standards.”).
77
Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 71–72 (2012); see also Letter from Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y
of Educ., to Hon. John Kline, Chairman, Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, U.S. House
of Representatives (July 6, 2011) (stating to Representative Kline that the Secretary
would “waive most statutory and regulatory requirements if needed”); see also Sam Dillon, Obama to Waive Parts of No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/education-/23educ.html?_r=0 (“[U]nder the plan
outlined by the White House, Secretary of Education Duncan would allow states that
agree to overhaul low-performing schools and adopt more rigorous teacher evaluation
systems to apply for relief from the Bush-era law’s 2014 deadline and other unpopular
provisions. States that qualify for the waivers would be allowed to design their own
school accountability systems.”).
78
Winnie Hu, 10 States Are Given Waivers From Education Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/10-states-given-waiversfrom-no-child-left-behind-law.html?ref=nochildleftbehindact (detailing that Secretary
Duncan said the states, including New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Georgia,
Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Colorado, Minnesota, and Oklahoma, “had agreed to adopt
standards for college and career readiness; implement new accountability systems with
more flexibility in assessing student achievement; and develop evaluation and support
systems based on measures to improve teacher effectiveness.”).
79
Richard Perez-Pena, Waivers for 8 More States From “No Child Left Behind,”
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/education/eight-morestates-get-waiver-from-no-child-law.html?ref=nochildleftbehindact&_r=0
(specifying
the states included: Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Rhode Island).
80
Motoko Rich, 5 More States Get Waivers From Education Law Rules, N.Y.
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administration has issued waivers to “more than half the
nation’s states freeing them from central provisions of the
law, raising the question of whether the decade-old federal
program has been essentially nullified.”81 By September of
2013, 41 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 districts in
California had been granted NCLB “flexibility waivers” by the
U.S. Department of Education.82
V.

CONSTITUTIONALITY VERSUS PRACTICALITY

Under Section 9401 of the ESEA, “the Secretary [of
Education] may waive any statutory or regulatory requirement
of this chapter for a State educational agency, local educational
agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local educational
agency, that (1) receives funds under a program authorized by
this chapter; and (2) requests a waiver under subsection (b) of
this section.”83 While it is evident that broad, discretionary
power is given to the Secretary of Education to issue waivers to
any requirement,84 the Secretary does not have the authority
under Section 9401 to impose new conditions on school
districts. Many argue that Section 9401 does not expressly
forbid voluntary conditions on waivers and that accepting such
conditional waivers has been common practice.85 Yet when

TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/education/5-more-statesget-waivers-from-education-law-rules.html?ref=nochildleftbehindact (noting that “Friday’s action by the administration brings to a total of 24 the number of states that have
received waivers, and applications from an additional 13 states are under review.”).
81
No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6.
82
Michele McNeil, NCLB Waiver-Renewal Process Turns Up Heat on States,
EDUC.
WEEK
(Sep.
10,
2013),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/09/11/03waiver_ep.h33.html?qs=nclb+waivers
+issued+in+2013 (“Thirty-five of those waivers were approved in the first two rounds,
which means their flexibility expires at the end of the 2013–14 school year. Those 35
will be the first to go through the renewal process.”).
83
20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2011); see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2.
84
See BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 12 (noting that the Secretary’s discretionary authority was affirmed when a federal court rejected a state’s challenge to a
denial of its waiver request in State of Connecticut v. Spellings); see also State of Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 495 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d as modified sub
nom. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1471
(2011) (stating that “[T]he language of the provision governing waivers grants the Secretary broad discretion to deny states’ waiver requests.”); see, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
85
Brown & Ayers, supra note 2; see BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 4 (there
has not been a legal challenge to the Secretary’s broad and extensive waiver authority
in federal court).
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waivers are dependent on states accepting the Obama
administration’s education policies,86 the Secretary is imposing
the federal education policy agenda on states, which is not
permitted under Section 9401 of the ESEA.87
Conditional
waivers
raise
serious
questions
of
constitutionality as well. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
empowers Congress “to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper.”88 When states and school districts are required to
implement the Obama administration’s education policies to
receive waiver approval, Article I is violated. President Obama
effectively enacts federal education policy through conditional
waivers without the input of, or legislation passed by, both
Houses of Congress the Constitution requires.89 However, when
there is no prospect of legislation passing Congress in a divided
political climate, what option does the President have but to act
to create some makeshift federal education policy? The NCLB
Act was up for reauthorization in 2007, yet no cohesive
legislation has been passed to correct its weaknesses and states
repeatedly fail to make adequate yearly progress as required to
avoid sanctions.90
Despite real-world practicality concerns over the
continuation of the NCLB provisions, the unconstitutionality of
implementing education policy through conditional waivers
remains paramount. Although President Obama faces a
politically divided Congress with little desire to compromise,
the ability to pass legislation is Congress’ authority alone

86
Hu, supra note 78; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 79 (specifying that the
waivers were granted “in exchange for an agreement by states to meet new standards,
in a longer time frame, that Arne Duncan, the education secretary, says are tougher”);
Rich, supra note 80 (reporting these states agreed “to enact new standards and evaluate schools and teachers based on students’ academic progress” in accordance with
President Obama’s education policy agenda).
87
See BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (while the Secretary is not explicitly
requiring the conditions, the reality is that a waiver’s approval is dependent on the
state acquiescing to new conditions).
88
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
89
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 3 (These provisions are the primary justifications
for unilateral action by the executive); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (ruling that where the House takes actions that have the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties, or relations of persons outside of the legislative branch, bicameralism and presentment are required).
90
See Brown & Ayers, supra note 2 (stating that NCLB has been operating on
“auto-pilot” since 2007); see also Kenny, supra note 8 (noting that during the 2010–
2011 school year, almost half of all public schools in the country failed to meet the educational goals based on the NCLB ratings system goals).
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under Article I of the Constitution.91 While a comprehensive
policy to improve our public schools is long overdo, conditional
waivers that circumvent the legislative process and put a bandaid on a continuously bleeding system are not the answer.
Conditional waivers lack comprehensive education policy
provisions, set a dangerous precedent for future legislation,
and undermine the legislative process central to our
democracy.92
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that America’s education system needs saving.
A comprehensive education bill that respects the legislative
process and our constitutional foundation is the solution. This
idea may seem optimistic, unrealistic, or even delusional, as
partisan politics are so strongly embedded in Congress that
compromise seems a mere fantasy of another era. So, we allow
President Obama to evade the political divide in Congress
through executive action, as he tells us, “[w]e can’t wait for an
increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they
won’t act, I will.”93 Yet, unilateral executive action that
undermines the Constitution must be analyzed under a
rigorous standard, for more is at stake than merely the issues
being addressed. The issuance of conditional waivers
challenges the legitimacy of government decision-making and
adherence to our constitutional order.
Courtney K. Morgan*

91
Id. (arguing that “[t]o refuse to pass any piece of legislation is as much a
function of legislative power as to pass it.”).
92
Id. (noting President Obama’s actions in bypassing the legislative process
and using executive action to “prevent drug shortages, raise fuel-efficiency standards,
and cut refinancing fees for federally insured mortgages”); see also Marc Tucker, The
Feds’
Education
Power
Grab,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/-jan/24/opinion/la-oe-tucker-nationalization-ofeducation-20130124 (“The denial is disturbing for what it reveals: namely, that the
American education system is being reshaped in a truly fundamental way, and with
little debate.”).
93
President Barack Obama, Office of the White House Press Secretary, American Jobs Act (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/jobsact; but see Kenny, supra note 8 (arguing that “the refusal of either house to pass the president’s agenda hardly makes the Congress ‘dysfunctional.’”).
* Juris Doctor, St. John’s University School of Law 2013. I would like to thank Professor Rosemary Salomone for her exceptional guidance on this project.

